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BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION-SUITS By TRusTEE-IN RX HAMMoND, 98 Fed.
845.-Within four months of filing of petition in bankruptcy, a creditor at-
tached property of bankrupt's wife, she not having filed certificate making
her a feme sole trader. The trustee in bankruptcy instituted proceedings for
the recovery of said property. Held, that it was within the jurisdiction of the
District Court to compel such surrender.
As the attachment was in connection with proceedings in bankruptcy, the
presumption would be in favor of Federal Court jurisdiction under the act of
'98, and the weight of authority seems to sustain the decision reached. In re
Francis- Valentine Co., 94 Fed. 793. The attachment was through the State
Courts, and hence there may be grounds for disputing the jurisdiction of the
District Court, as was held in the majority opinion of In re Abraham, 93
Fed. 767.
BANKRUPTCY-JURISDICTION-SuITS BY TRUSTEES, 99 Fed. 546.-The trustee
in bankruptcy brought a bill in equity to set aside a sale of goods to the
-defendants, as being fraudulent to creditors. The suit was brought in the
District Court, and, relying upon a clause in the Banks Act, 18g8, § 23 b, pro-
viding that "suits by the trustee shall only be brought in the courts where the
bankrupt might have brought them," the respondents demurred to the bill on
the ground that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. Held, that the court
had jurisdiction.
The decisions of the courts upon this question have been far from uniform.
The section of the Banks Act quoted above, however, was simply a limitation
of the jurisdiction of the'Circuit Courts. It does not affect the jurisdiction in
bankruptcy conferred upon the District Court in other clauses of the Act. In
re Severs, 91 Fed. 366; Carter v. Hobbs, 92 Fed. 594. As regards State
courts, this decision is not to be taken as a limitation of their jurisdiction in
suits brought by trustees in bankruptcy, but the court taking cognizance of the
case first shall have final and conclusive disposition of it. Woolridge v. Mc-
Kenna, 8 Fed. 650; In re .6russ, Ritter Co., z Nat. Banks, N. 58, 9o Fed.
651.
CARR ES-BAGGAGE-CoMmK cLU. TRvEL-R-SAieLzs-ExTRA Coing.
sATIoN--TIMBLx v. NEW YoaK CENT. AND H. R. R. Co., 56 N. E. 532 (N. Y.).
-Held, that where a baggageman received a trunk from a traveling salesman
,for transportation, making extra charge for overweight, the company could
not escape liability for its loss on the ground that the baggageman had no
authority to check the baggage in violation of a rule of the company against
checking baggage of this class without the signing of a release of liability by
the shipper. Parker, C. J., and O'Brien and Landon, J. J., dissenting.
The question raised in this case is, whether the baggageman had knowl-
edge of the contents of the trunk when he checked it. Since he asked no
questions the presumption is against him. If anything is delivered to a person
to be carried it is the duty of the person receiving it to ask such questions
about it as may be necessary, or he is bound to carry the parcel as it is.
Walker v.Jackson, ioM. &W. 168. O'Brien, J., in a dissenting opinion,
holds that the baggageman had no knowledge of the contents of the trunk,
except from its appearance, which does not constitute knowledge, and there-
fore the company should not be held liable.
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COMMON CARRIERS-CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY-JENNINGS V. SMITH, 99
Fed. 189 (Ill.).-Plaintiff, with full knowledge of facts, signed a contract pro-
viding that in consideration of a lower rate of freight, his recovery in case of
damage should be limited to $ioo.oo for each horse shipped. Held, notwith-
standing an Illinois statute to the contrary, that the confract was binding on
the shipper.
The opinion in this case is by no means clear and would seem at first
glance to be at variance with the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the
leading case of N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wallace 357 (1873). In
Liverfiool &, G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397(1888), the
case on which the judge bases his opinion, Hart v. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331
(1884), is approved as being in accordance with the Lockwood case. How-
ever, here the common carrier is not denying its liability for loss resulting
from the negligence of its servants, but merely limiting the amount of such
liability. In view of the fact that the common carrier and the individual are
by no means on an equal footing, to prevent a dangerons extension of this
exception, the reasonableness of the exemption must always be the criterion.
In New York State, however, a contrary doctrine has long since been estab-
lished, and the carrier can exempt itself from every claim of damages, even
though same be occasioned through fault on its part, provided that the con-
tract of transportation fairly embodies such exceptii6-s. Plattsburg v. Erie
R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 123.
CARRIERS-FREE TRANSPORTATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ATCHISON, T.
& S. F. RY. Co. V. CAMPBELL, 59 Pac. 1051 (Kan.).-Held, that the statute
(Chap. x67, Laws 1897) requiring railroad companies to furnish free transpor-
tation to a drover accompanying a car of stock, at the usual price of shipment,
to and from his destination, is a deprivation of property without due process
of law and unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
While it is well settled that the Legislature has a certain control over
rates, the extent of this control has not been so well settled. This is an extreme
attempt, but the opinion is sustained on the principle of Railroad Co. v. Smith,
173 U. S. 684,x 9 Sup. Ct. 685, in its reversal of 72 N. W. 328 (Mich.). See also
cases cited in note to Winchester v. L. Turnfi. Road Co. v. Crorton, 33 L.
R.. A. 177 (Ky.)
CARRIERS-INJURY OF PASSENGER AT STATION-CoNTIrNUANCE OF RELATION-
CHESAPEAKE & 0. R. Co. V. KING, 99 Fed. 251 (Ky.)-Passenger, having
properly left train at a place where it was necessary to cross intervening
tracks in order to reach a public road, was injured in crossing such tracks.
Held, that company was liable, as there was an implied agreement not to
make such exit unnecessarily dangerous.
Many jurisdictions hold it to be negligence per se if a traveler fail to look
and listen before crossing a track. R. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 Fed. 697. But
in this case it is held that the person using the means of egress provided by
the company was still a passenger, and, as such, while not excused from all
care, was nevertheless entitled to expect a high degree of care on the part of
the carrier. The question of passenger's negligence is usually one of fact for
Thejury. Graven v. MfacLeod, 92 Fed. 846.
CARRIERS - PASSENGER ELEVATORS - NEGLIGENCE - OWNmR's LIABILInY-
GRFrFzN v. MAN Ic, 62 N. Y. Sup. 364.-The plaintiff sues, as administratrix,
to recover damages for death of her husband, which" she claims was caused by
the negligence of defendant. The *decedent was killed by the falling of some
weights attached to certain cables intended to be used in operating an elevator
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in defendant's office building. Plaintiff claims that defendant was negligent
in not having the elevator properly inspected and kept in a safe condition.
Held, that defendant was liable for negligence.
The court decided this case entirely on the ground that the owner of an
elevator is a carrier of passengers, and as such, is under obligations to use the
utmost care and diligence in providing and maintaining safe and suitable
appliances. Mitchell v. Marker, 62 Fed. Rep. 139; Hartford De.osit Co.
v. Sollitt, 172 Ill. 222. The same degree of care is not necessary with refer-
ence to the surroundings and other structure forming a part of the elevator
plant. McGrellv. Building Co., 153 N. Y. 271 When accident occurs through
the giving way of some portion of the machinery or appliances by which the
passenger is carried, in absence of rebuttal testimon-y offered by carrier,
plaintiff is held to have made out a frima facie case, establishing the negli-
gence of carrier, and entitling him to recover. Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law
(new ed.), vol. io, page 948; Treadwell v. Whittier, 8o Cal. 574; Goodsell v.
Taylor, 41 Minn. 207.
CARRIERS-WRONGFUL EJECTION OF PASSENGERS--LIABILITY-LOISVILLx
H. & ST. L. Ry. Co. v. JOPLIN, 55 S. W. 206 (Ky.).-In this case the appellee
had purchased a ticket on appellant's line, and lost it out of the car window
just as the train started. He offered to pay the conductor his ticket fare,
which the conductor accepted. Shortly afterward the conductor came back
and demanded the train fare, an additional sum which companies are allowed
to charge those who travel with no ticket. Appellee refused to pay this sum
and was ejected from the car by the conductor in a lonesome spot. Held,
that he could recover.
The conductor has no right to eject a passenger after having received, as
satisfactory, his ticket fare. Wardwell v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 6 Minn.
514. It is a well established rule that if a ticket be lost and the owner refuse
to pay the fare, he may be summarily ejected. But in this case the conductor
having accepted the ticket fare, is piecluded from demanding the residue. It
may be distinguished from that line of cases where the conductor, having dis-
covered his mistake, is allowed to demand the remainder. Wardwell v.,
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (supra). In this case no discovery of a mistake is
alleged.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-ADVANCES TO " CROPPER"--TENANCY IN COMMON-
McNiFL v. RYDER, 81 N. W. 830 (Minn.).-This was a contract for the cultiva-
tion of a farm on shares, by the terms of which the landlord reserved the
title to the cropper's share of the crops raised, as security for advances made
to him. Held, that the parties thereto, until division, were tenants in com-
mon of the crops, and that the contract was in legal effect a chattel mortgage,
and was required to be filed on record, as against creditors and subsequent
bona fide purchasers.
There is some diversity of opinion in other jurisdictions over this ques.
tion. See note x, 8 A. &- E. Encl. Of L. (2d ed.) 323; but the weight of author-
ity seems to be that the legal title, control and possession of the crops shall
remain in the owner of the land until the cropper has fully performed, and
until there has been a division of the crops, the reservation or contract does
not operate merely as a mortgage to secure the landlord, but the title of the
entire crop is in him, and it can neither be sold by the tenant, nor levied on by
his creditors. 8 A. & E. Encycl. of L. (2d ed.) 323-325, and cases cited.
CHEcKs-OPERATIoN-TRANFER OF TITLE-RcKERT v. SUDDARD, ET AL.,
56 N. E. 344 (ll.).-The Mechanics and Traders Savings, Loan & Building Asso-
ciation gave to Mabel T. Rickert, upon her withdrawal from the association, a
check on the American Exchange National Bank of Chicago, where the associ-
atiozi had sufficient funds to meet it. Before presentation of the check the
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State Auditor took charge of the affairs of the association, including the money
in the bank. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to the full amount of the check,
though the association was insolvent at the time it was given.
The doctrine that is sustained by the weight of authority in the United
States, is that an unaccepted check drawn in the ordinary form, not describing
any particular fund, or using words of transfer of the whole or any part of any
amount standing to the credit of the drawer, does not amount to an assignment
at law or in equity of the money to the credit of the holder. - Harrison v.
Wright, ioo Ind. 515; Lunt v. Bank of North America, 49 Barb. (N. Y.)
221. Some States hold that the giving of a check transfers to its holder the
title to so much of the money in the bank as the check calls for. C/outeau
et al. v. Rouse, 56 Mo. 65. Under the Negotiable Instruments Act, now in
force in New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts and some other states, a check
of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the
credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder,
unless and until it accepts or certifies the check.
CONsTITUTIoNAL LAw-DEPARTMENT STORES-PoLICE PowER-TAxATxoN-
STATUTES-VALIDITY-STATE EX XEL. WYATT V. ASHBROOK ET AL., 55 S. W.
627 (Mo.).-An act passed in Missouri in 1899, known as "The Anti-Depart-
ment Store Act," divided merchandise into a certain number of classes, and
prohibited any person, firm or corporation, in towns of 5o,ooo inhabitants or
more and employing fifteen or more clerks, from selling goods of more than
one class without first paying a special tax of not more than $500 or less than
$3oo, to be determined by the different commissioners for each city. Held, to
be unconstitutional.
Such an act is not a proper police regulation, so it contravenes the Consti-
tutional provision which vests the taxing power for municipal purposes in the
municipal corporations under authority of the General Assembly. It also
violates the Constitutional provision that all taxes for public purposes shall be
uniform on the same class of subjects within the limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax, and that all taxes shallbe levied and collected by a general law. It
is aimed directly at department stores in large cities, and as such is distinctl)
class legislation. State v. Trenton, 42 N. J. L. 486.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-STREET REPAIRS-TATJE V. FRAWLEY, 27 South.
Rep. 339 (La.).-Defendant contracted with the City of New Orleans to re-ar-
range the guttering on a certain street, protecting public safety with lights,
etc. A hole of three feet in the gutter was left without light or boarding over,
into which defendant fell when running for a car at night. Held, no recovery.
While the court virtually concedes the negligence of the defendent, it fur-
ther announces that a man running for a car at night is necessarily so intent
on catching the car that he does not take proper care of where he is going,
hence finds plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. Judge Blanchard di
sents, but writes no opinion. See Mahan v. EVerett, 5o La. Am. ii67.
CORPORATIONS-DmDENDS--TRUST FUNDs-HUNT v. O'SHEA, 45 AtL Rep.
480 (N. H.).-SUit is brought against defendant as assignee of an insolvent
company for a dividend declared some time before its insolvency on stock held
by plaintiff, but which dividend was not collected. Held, a recovery may be
had only on a basis with other creditors.
A dividend declared by a corporation is not a trust fund for the stockhold-
ers' benefit, but a debt from the corporation to them. Lowne v. Ins. Co., 6
Paige 482, I Mor. Priv. Corp., § 445. However, if the company had set funds
aside to pay the dividend a trust would have resulted, and the plaintiff would
have recovered the entire dividend. King et al. v. R. R. Co., 29 N. J. L. 82.
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CORPORATION-ORGANIZATIoN-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS AS CO-PART-
WERS-SLoCUM V. HEAD xv AL., 81 N. W. 673 (Wis.).-Defendants claim that
they are a corporation, incorporated under Chapter 113, Laws of 1874, to carry
on a general banking business. They had failed to comply with all the statu-
tory requirements, but had by the manner in which they had carried on their
business and by their intent become a corporation de facto. Plaintiff sues to
recover a sum of money deposited with defendants, and seeks to hold the
stockholders liable as co-partners on the ground that defendant's cashier had
informed plaintiff that defendants were partners. Held, that on the evidence
defendants were liable as partners.
In general one who contracts with a corporation as such is estopped fromdenng itscorporate existence, or the regularity of its organization. Amer.and Eng. Ency. of Law (old ed.) Vol. 4, P. I99; /rohnson v. Gibson, 78 Ind. 282;Chubb v. Uriton, 9s U. S. 666. But where plaintiff had dealt with an agent,and was apparently ignorant that the principals even claimed to be a corpora-
tion, they were held liable as partners. Martin v. Fewell 79 MO. 401.
DAMAGES-MENTAL ANGUIsH-BREACH OF CONTRACT-JONES v. TEXAs AND
N. 0. Ry. Co., 55 S. W. 371 (Tex.).-Plaintiff sued on a breach of contract for
damages for mental suffering and loss of time sustained by reason of defend-
ant's agent's negligence in not stopping a train. Held, he could not recover,
his anxiety and circumstances not being known to the station agent
Some courts have held that damages for mental anguish cannot be recov-
ered unless connected with bodily pain. Tri v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 74
Mo. I47; Sohn v. Missouri1ac. Ry. Co., 116 Mo. 617. Others, and this seems
the better rule, hold that mental suffering, though not sufficient per se to sup-port an action, may constitute an element of damages when it results from an
injury sufficient to give rise to au action. Stretry v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 73Wis. 147; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kaiser, 82 Tex. 144; Sedg-wick on Dam-
ages, § 44. There seems to have been a sufficient injury in this case to giverise to an action, since for a failure to carry, a passenger can recover for theactual loss sustained by him Indianaolis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Birney, 7 111. 391;
But the courts have always held that only such damages for a breach of con-tract are recoverable as are reasonably within the contemplation of the parties
when the contract was entered into. Burton v. Pinkerton, L. R. 2 Exch. 34o;
Walrath v. Whittekind, 26 Kan. 482. The station agent not being informedby the plaintiff that it was necessary for him to take that train, or what dam-ages he would sustain if he did not take it, the court properly held that therecould be no recovery for mental suffering incurred by the agent's ignorance.
DuxEgs-AvoIDANCE OF CONTRACTS-JAEGER V. KOENIG, 62 N. Y., Sup.
803.-Where plaintiff paid money to defendant equal in amount to a sum stolen
by her husband under threat of prosecution in case of non-payment, held,
duress, and money so paid recoverable. See discussion of Bank v. Cox, imme-
diately following.
DURESS-MORTGAGS-NATIONAL BANE: OF REPUBLIC OF NEw YORE v. Cox,
62 N. Y., Sup. 314.-Action brought to foreclose a mortgage alleged to have
been made by defendant Defendant's son had forged checks on plaintiff
bank, using name of one Minor. Minor had sued bank to recover amount of
forged checks. Defendant claims that she was induced to execute the mort-
gage by promises that the bank and Minor would not prosecute her son if she
executed the mortgage. These promises and threats were made to her before
one Fisher, who claimed that he had made the arrangements with the bank
and Minor. Held, that mortgage was executed under duress and was void-
able, though the bank had never authorized the statements.
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This case resembles Jager v. Koenig, just preceding, and both together
would seem to clearly settle the present law of New York on the subject of
duress. Whether it is duress fer minas to threaten to do what one has a legal
right to do, namely, to prosecute for a criminal act, is not definitely settled by
the decisions. On the one hand some jurisdictions hold that threats to coerce
the undoing of an act of which the party has been guilty are not threats of
unlawful imprisonment. Cf. Ttorn v. Pinkham, 84 Me. 1o3; Knafifi v. Hyde,
6o Barb. (N. Y.) 8o. Other jurisdictions, however, hold that such threat is of
unlawful imprisonment when made for the sole purpose of inducing the exe-
cution of a contract or conveyance, even though the party was guilty of the
charge for which prosecution was threatened. Cf. zlorse v. Woodworth, 155
Mass. 235. This is also the later view of the New York courts. Cf. Schoener
v. Tissner, X07 N. Y. III; Adams v. Bank, 116 N. Y. 6o6; Jaeger v. Koenig,
62 N. Y., Sup. 803, supra.
EMINENT DOMAIN-IMPROVEMENTS ON RIGHT OF WAY-ST. Louis K. & S.
W. R. Co. v. TRYCE ET AL., 59 Pac. io4o(Kan.).-A railroad company obtained
deeds for mortgaged land and built its road thereon. The mortage being
foreclosed, the railroad company instituted condemnation proceedings against
the new owner. Held, that improvements placed upon the land by the rail-
road and necessary to the operation of the road, are trade fixtures and not
accessories of the land to which they are attached, and are not to be recovered
for when the land is condemned.
This case overrules Briggs v. Railroad Co., 43 Pac. 11, 56 Kan. 526,
which held that the improvements became realproperty and might be recovered
for by the owner of the land when condemned by the railroad. The result
reached in the present case undoubtedly accords with the weight of authority
as to what may be recovered for. Am. Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) io-I159;
Ellis v. Rock Island, etc., A'. Co. 125 IlL. 82, and cases cited in opinion under
review. The difficulty of the courts in reaching this result has been in deter-
mining the character of the iniprovements. The road-bed, rails, depots, etc.,
were held real property in Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 25
Barb. 493; personal chattels, in Albion River R Co. v. Hesser, 48 Cal. 435.
This opinion and Northern Cent. R. Co. v. Canton Co., 3o Md. 347, solve this
difficulty by classing them as trade fixtures.
EVIDENcE-ADMIssION-RvEsmrIBL EPxo-DRuRy v. TER1-TORY, 60 Pae.
io tOkla.)-Held, where illegal and incompetent evidence has bedn permitted
to go to the jury and subsequently they are directed to disregard it, if the illegal
evidence were of such a character as would ordinarily create such a prejudice
against the defendant as was reasonably calculated to make a fixed impression
on the minds of the jury, and influence their verdict, and the court is unable
to say, on an examination of the whole case, that such evidence did not affect
the verdict, there is reversible error.
This is a modification of the rule laid down in Pa. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S.
451, that a subsequent withdrawal from the jury cancels tho admission of
improper evidence. Throckmorton v. Holt. 12 App. D. C. 451. The rule is
well established in the United States Courts. The jury are presumed to fol-
low the instruction of the court and disregard improper evidence. Anthony v.
Travis, 148 Mass. 513; Smith v. Whitman, 6 Allen 5o2. The rule of this case
is substantially in accord with Wersebe v. Broadway &- S. A. R. Co., z Misc.
Rep. (N. Y.), 472; City of Chica o v. Brennan. 61 Ill. App. 247; Taylor v.
Adams, q4 Mich. xo6. See also Enc. P1. &- Prac. 2-560.
EvIDENcE-ExCLAMATIONS OF PAIN-ADMissrBuITY-JACKSON v. MISSOURI
K. &. T. Ry. Co. 55 S. W. 376 (Texas).-Plaintiff having been injured while
working in a sand pit, through.the negligence of the defendant, sought to
introduce evidence of his exclamations of pain uttered after suit had been
brought. Held, they were admissible.
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Such exclamations as are natural and spontaneous utterances caused by
present pain, are competent testimony. Fay v. Harlan. 128 Mass. 244;
Wheeler v. Railway Co., 43 S. W. 876. They are part of the res jestae and
not hearsay evidence. Under proper circumstances, they are admissible.
even after suit has been instituted. Ry. Co. v. Newell, 104 fnd. 264: Quaife v.
Ry. Co., 4 N. W. 6s8. Greenleaf on Evidence: "The mere fact that a suit
was pending would not exclude such testimony." i Green, 6 26.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-HOMESTEAD-TRANSFER TO WIFE-KETTLE-
SCHLAGER v. FERRICK, Si N. W. 889 (S. D.).-A transfer of the homestead
from the defendant to his wife, was made to preyent creditors from subjecting
the premises to the satisfaction of their claims. Seven years afterwards the
defendant removed to a new homestead, and an action was then brought by a
judgment creditor to set the deed aside as fraudulent. Held, that the deed of
conveyance did not pass title, but was colorable only, and should be set aside,
as the mere contrivance of a dishonest debtor; 6o Texas i39.
The rule in some jurisdictions is that such a conveyance, whether made to
defraud creditors or not. would still be valid, as such property cannot be sub-
ject to a fraudulent convevance, for the reason that the rights of no creditor
can be prejudiced by it. Patlen v. Smith, 4 Conn. 450; Butmp on Fraud, Con.
p. 268; Deutzer v. Bell, ii Wis. 114.
GIFT-DEPOSIT IN BANK-PENINSULAR SAV. BANK v. AVINEMAN ET AL., SI
N. W. iogi (Mich.).-Where a husband deposited money in a bank to his
wife's credit, and a pass book was issued in her name, the wife not knowing
that the money was deposited to her credit until after her husband's death,
held, in the absence of acts and declarations indicating an intention to donate
the fund, it did not constitute a gift. Broderick v. Bank, 1o9 'Mass. i49;
Sherman v. Bank, 138 Mass. 58i; contra, Howard v. Bank, 40 Vt. 597.
INJUNcTIoN---GROU.N¢Ds-THREATENING SUITS FOR INFRINGEME.NT OF PATE-T
-A. B. FARQUAHAR Co., LTD., V. NATIONAL HARROW Co., 99 Fed. i6o (N. J.).
-The owner of a patent sent out circulars saying that complainant infringes
such patent, that complainant is not financially responsible, and that the re-
cipients will be subjected to suit if they continue to handle the infringement.
Held, that a court of equity will not enjoin the sending out of such cir-
culars.
The English courts have generally granted an injunction to restrain libel-
lous publications against the business of another. The current of American
decisions has been the other way on the ground of there being an adequate
remedy at law for the alleged libel. It will be seen that this case is at variance
with Adriance. Platt & Co. v. Nat. Harrow Co., 98 Fed. uS, 9 Y.ALE LAW
JOURNAL 233, which seems to incline to the English rule, and it will also be
noted that the state of facts and defendants in the two cases are identical.
INJURY TO EMPLOYEE-VICE PRINCIPAL-NEGLIGENCE-METROPOLITAN -WEST
SHORE R. R. v. SKOLA, 56 N. E. 171 (Ill.) -The foreman of the work of clean-
ing. repairing and inspecting cars, ran a car into the shed for cleaning. In
doing so he ran into a car under which deceased, by order of said foreman,
was at work, and killed him. Held, foreman was to be considered a vice prin-
cipil, and that company could be held for the death of the plaintifs intestate.
The present case is a close one on the question as to the distinction between
fellow servants and vice principal, and illustrates the difficulties Shaw. C. J.,
mentions in Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Co., 4 Metc. 49, when we attempt
to draw'a distinction between them. The Illinois courts have been more
willing to recognize this distinction than have those of Massachusetts. Toledo
R. Co. v. Ingraham, 77 Ill. 309, and the present case shows to what an
extent it may be carried.
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INSURANCE-IGNITION-FITZGERALD V. GERMAN-AMERICAN INS. Co , 62 N. Y.
Sup. 824.-Defendant insured plaintiff against fire. Smoke and heat from
burning lamp produced damage. Held, no recovery.
Some authorities announce the proposition that the results of a fire (not
amounting to ignition themselves) cannot be the ground for recovery on an
insurance policy unless the fire producing these results creates a liability on
the policy. Hughes on Ins. 390; Auszn v. DreW. 6 Taunt. 435; Gibbons v.
Ins. Co. 30 Ills. App. 263. But equally strong authorities take the other view.
Balestricci v. Ins. Co., 34 La. Ann. 844; May on Ins., § 412. This doctrine
has been most frequently applied in actions on insurance policies in conse.
quence of explosions und damages arising from adjacent fires. St. John v.
ins. Co., ii N. Y. 516. Sohier v. Ins. Co., xi Allen (Mass.) 336.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE REGULATIONS-OLEOMARGARINE LAW OF
MISSOURI-IN RE SCHEITLIN, 99 Fed. 273.-The provision of a State law pro-
hibiting the manufacture or sale within the State of any substance "in imita-
tion or semblance of butter," is a proper regulation within the police power
of the State, and its enforcement as to original package importations is not
a violation of the constitutional interstate commerce clause.
It was strongly contended that no restrictions or limitations upon the sale
of oleomargerine could be made by any State, because the Supreme Court in a
leading case decided that it was an article of commerce and declared void a
Penn. statute which prohibited its sale even when the same was shipped into
the State for sale in the original package. Sciwllenberger v. Penn., 171 U. S.
I. It is, without doubt, within the police power of a State to pass regulations
to prevent fraud and deception as to articles of food. The Missouri statute is
distinguished from the former Pennsylvania law in that it did not prohibit the
sale of oleomargarine, bnt merely required it to be sold as such. The case
resembles Plumley v. Webb, 155 U. S. 461, in which Justice Harlan pointedly
said: "The Constitution does not secure to anyone the privilege of defrauding
the public."
JUDGMENT AGAINST CITy-TAxPAYERS' RIGHT TO ENJOIN-BusH V.
O'BRIEN, 62 N. Y., Sup. 685.-This an action by a taxpayer under the Statute
(Civ. Code 1925), to restrain certain parties from collecting judgments which
are alleged to be invalid, against the City of New York. Held, a taxpayer
cannot enjoin payment of a valid judgment against a city where there is no
fraud alleged as to its entry, on an offer by the corporation counsel, and
acceptance by plaintiff, and where the only ground on which it is attacked is
that it was irregularly entered in a pending action. His only remedy is by
appeal from the judgment, or by a motion to set it aside. McLaughlin, J.,
dissents.
It would seem that if this statute is to be construed so as to preclude suchcases as the above, the object of the statute will be defeated. The judgments
which it is sought to enjoin are so irregular as to create much doubt as to theirvalidity, to pay them would be a breach of official duty on the part of the
Comptroller, and a breach of official duty is sufficient to enable a taxpayer to
bring an action. (Adamson v. R. R. Co., 79 Hun 3). In fact all the elements
of a right of action exist, "the status of the plaintiff, the illegal judgment, the
threatened injury by which the property of the taxpayer will be burdened."
LANDLORD-EVICTION-SCKNESs-PEEISERE V. WILANDT, 62 N. Y., Sup.
8qo. Plaintiff's lease of defendant's premises expired on June 5th. When
plaintiff was notified to vacate, he informed defendant that his wife was very
ill and could not be moved. On June 6th, defendant started to pull down the
house, causing the plaintiff's wife much suffering from the dust and noise,
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which so aggravated her illness that she died a few days later. Held, that
defendant was liable, though deceased suffered no immediate personal injury,
and her death was due solely to fright and excitement.
The case of Herter v. Mullen, et at., 53 N. E. 700 settles the question of
the tenant's right to hold over without a renewal of the lease, provided the
delay was caused by serious illness in the family.
Defendant denied right to recover on the ground that there was no imme-
diate personal injury suffered by Mrs. Preiser. In Stade v. R. R. Co., 47 N. E.
89, it was held that recovery could be had when " gross carelessness or utter
indifference to consequences" was shown. And since the landlord was a
wrong-doer, the court was justified in reversing the decision of the lower
court.
LICENsEs-NN-PAYMENT-PucK=T- V. FORE, 27 South Rep. 381 (Miss.).-
Where plaintiff sold goods to defendant, taking notes and mortgage therefor,
one of which notes being for merchandise sold during a time when plaintiff
had not paid his privilege tax for conducting business, held, non-collectible.
The court fails to recognize a distinction frequently laid down, that where
the tax is laid simply for raising revenue, the purchase money of a sale is
collectible. Larne v. Andrews, io6 Mass. 435, but when the nature of the
license is prohibitory, no recovery may be had. Miller v. Post, z Allen 434.
LIENS-DuE PROCESS OF LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERcE-LNDSAY & PHELPS
Co. v. MULLEN, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325.-Held, a Minnesota statute was constitu-
tional, giving surveyor general a lien upon all logs in any boom, under which
plaintiff's logs were seized and held to answer for charges assessed against the
whole boom, although plaintiff's logs formed only a part of said boom. The
majority of the court gave the following reasons: (I) it was within the power of
the legislature; to require the officer to stand watch at the exit of the boom and
collect his fees from each log owner would be unreasonable; (2) was not taking
property without due process of law, the plaintiff having voluntarily put his
logs in the boom; (3) nor was it a burden upon interstate commerce, but rather
facilitated it.
In dissenting, Peckham J., with whom three others concurred, argued that
the log owner was practically compelled to put his logs in the boom; under
these circumstances to seize them for another's debt leaves no idoubt of its
utter illegality; and a State regulation that confiscates property engaged in
commerce for the debts of another is clearly a restriction upon interstate com-
merce.
LIFE INSURANCE - SUICIDE -EVIDENCE- SUFFICIENCY - SOVEREIGN CAMP
WOODM-.N OF THE WoR.o v. HALLER, s6 N. E. 255 (Ind.).-A provision in an
insurance policy was as follows: "If the member holding this certificate shall
* * * die by his own hand * * * this certificate shall be null and
void." The insured, a hard drinker, whose family relations were unpleasant, dis-
appeared after being served with notice of divorce proceedings begun by his
wife. His body, without marks of violence upon it, was found in a stream.
Held, that the evidence excluded with reasonable certainty any hypothesis of
death by any other cause than suicide. Robinson, J., dissenting.
The court in this case apparently takes little notice of the fact that in most
jurisdictions courts are very reluctant to find that a man died by his own hand
when there can be the slightest doubt. The legal presumption is that when
death is referable to either cause, it was due to accident and not to self-destruc-
tion. Travelers Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., v. Nicklas, 4 At. 9o6. Where
a provision in an insurance policy states that the company is relieved from lia-
bility for deaths from suicide, the burden is on the insurer to show the viola-
tion of an otherwise valid policy. Malickiv. Chicago Guaranty Fund Life
Soc., 77 N. W. 69o (Ill.).
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LIMiTATIoNs-AssUMPTIoN OF MORTGAGE-PAYMENT OF INTEREST-BEDDLE
v. PUGH, 45 Atl. Rep. 626 (N. J.).-Held, the payment of interest by successive
grantees, who assumed a mortgage, kept the statute from running in favor of
mortgagor, notwithstanding sixteen years more than the period required had
elapsed since any payment by him.
There are two rules, (i) that a tender to one entitled to receive by one lia-
ble to pay is sufficient, and successive grantees come within this rule. In re
Frisbie, 43 Chan Div. 117; Lewin v. Wilson, ix App. Cas 639; (2) that such
grantees pay merely to keep alive the equity of redemption, and do not keep
the statute from running. Trustees v. Smith, 52 Conn. 434. Where the mort-
gagor after sale becomes a surety the first seems the better rule, but where by
sale of the property in States holding the lien theory he becomes a mere
stranger, the second would probably prevail. Lord v. Morris, I8 Cal. 482.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WVRONGFUL DEATH OF SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS-GULF, C. & S. Ry. Co. v. DELANEY, 55 S. W. 538
(Tex.).-A brakeman on a freight train was killed by the falling of derricks,
used by an independent contractor, due to the breaking of a post to which
guy ropes were fastened. The independent contractor was repairing defend-
ant's road-bed. Held, the railroad company was liable.
An employe, when placed in a situation of dangerhas a right to expect that
the employer will not, without proper warning, subject him to perils unknown to
the employe. Haley v. Case, 142 Mass. 316. Moreover, the employer owes his
servants, while working on his tracks and his trains, the duty to furnish them
a reasonably safe place to work; nothing short of the exercise of reasonable
care can absolve him from this obligation. In this case the defendant com-
pany were clearly guilty of negligence, as the guy ropes had not been securely
fastened, and the derricks ought not to have been used across its tracks, with-
out some care being taken to discover and guard against the danger. As a
general rule, the employer is not liable for injuries resulting from fault of an
independent contractor, but in this case the negligence of the railway com-
pany was properly held to be the proximate cause of the injury.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LNJURY TO SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-RAIL-
ROADS-NEGLIGENCE-TERRE HAUTE & I. R. Co. v. FOWLER, 56 N. E. 228 (Ind.).
-A freight conductor learning from the road superintendent that two culverts
were likely to be in a dangerous condition, detached his engine and started to
examine them; the first was found to be all right 9nd they proceeded to the
second. In attempting to cross a trestle between the two it gave way and the
conductor was killed. Held, that considering the emergency the conductor
was not acting outside the scope of his employment.
This case is apparently decided against the long established rule of law
that the master's liability to the servant extends only to the duty which the
servant is employed to perform, and if he undertakes any employment outside
that duty he is without remedy if injured. Brown v. Byroad, 47 d. 435
The question here involved, is whether the detaching of the engine by the
decedent, and voluntarily proceeding to inspect the track, was such a depar-
ture from the duties of his employment as to constitute negligence per se. The
peculiar emergency existing at the time is held to bring the conductor's act
within the scope of his employment. Wood on Master and Servant, p. I8i,
says: "Every servant is bound to regard his master's interests, and if a sud-
den emergency arises in his business, he is justified in departing from the
usual routine of his employment.
PARTNERSHIP-WHAT CONSTITUTES-HAwKINS v. CAMPBELL ET AL., 62 N.
Y. Sup. 678.-Action against Bell and Campbell is partners, to recover an
unpaid balance due the plaintiff. "Campbell denied the allegation .of partner-
ship. Held, an agreement whereby the partners were to share the profits of
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the business, and showing that each had contributed something to its capital
and fiossessed a definite interest in the business, is sufficient to constitute
them partners as to third persons, irrespective of their agreement not to
be partners, and that the liability of one of them was to be limited to a certain
amount.
The rule in New York as to what constitutes a partnership is evidently
construed much more broadly than in most other States, as is shown in the case
of Roter v. Shaefer, 35 Mo. At. 30, where it was held, on practically the same
state of facts, that a partnership as to third parties did not exist. 'This latter
is the more modern rule. 17 Am. &- Eng. Enc. 878, and is being followed by
most of the States.
PATENTS-INFRINGFMENT-SALE OF INFRINGI.G ARTIcLE, 99 Fed. 568.-The
defendant collected the various parts of a machine infringing a patent, and
then sold them at a profit to the co-defendant, a corporation. He was subse-
quently hired by the corporation to set up the completed machine. Held, that
he was liable as an infringer.
The decision disregards the case of Nickel Co. v. WVorthington (C. C.),
13 Fed. 393, and follows the principle that a person cannot retreat behind a
corporation and escape liability for infringements in which he actively par-
ticipates. Cash Regzster Co. v. Leland, 94 Fed. 502; Nat. Car Brake Co. v.
Terre Haute Manufacturing Co., E9 Fed. 514. The gist of the decision is
that everyone who has made a separate profit out of the sale of infringing
goods is held liable. Cramer v. Fry, 68 Fed. -oi; Mraltby v. Bobo, 53 Fed.,
cases No. 8, 998.
PRACTICE-BUZDN OF PROOF-GOOD FAITH-GOWING ET AL v. WAR-,%ER ET
AL., 62 N. Y., Sup. 797.-Plaintiff sold goods to Gerrish & Co. upon the latter's
false and fraudulent representations of its ability to pay, The goods were
then sold to defendants, and this action brought to recover possession or their
value. Held, burden of proof was on defendants to show good faith and not
a part of plaintiffs ,irimafacie case to prove the contrary.
The presumption of the bonafide character of an act does not maintain
where the fact of good faith is a material fact in a civil defense. Devoe v.
Brant, 53 N. Y. 462; AMcKelvey on Evi, § 54; Easter et al. v. Allen J,
Allen 7.
PRACTIcE-CoNcLUsIvENaSS OF SHERIFF*S RETURN-TAYI OR v. WELSLAGER,
45 At. Rep. 476 (Md.).-Where defendant claimed that the sheriff, after serv-
ing her, returned and told her not to appear, that he made a mistake in serving
her. Held, sheriff's return of service conclusive. Bennethum v. Bo-wers,
133 Pa. St. 332.
PRIZE-SALE OF ENEMY's VESSELS TO NEuTRA.s, 20 S. C. 489.-At the
beginning of the Spanish-American war, de Massa, a Spanish subject, made a
transfer of the steamer Benito Estenger to Beattie, a subject of Great Britain.
Shortly after, as the vessel was on a voyage to Kingston, she was captured by
a U. S. patrol and taken to Key West, where she was duly libelled. Held,
that the vessel was a lawful prize of war.
Formerly transfers of vessels "flagrante hello" were held invalid. Even
now in France this rule is stringently enforced. England and the United
States have departed from the principle, however, and admit the validity of
the sale. The circumstances attending the transfer in this case, however, viz.:
the conflicting statements as to price, the remaining of the Spanish master and
crew in charge of the vessel, the withholding of a certain interest by the
former owner, etc., clearly showed the presence of fraudulent intent anii the
use of the transfer as a protection -gainst Spanish capture. The January,
4 C. Rob. 3y; the Omnibus, 6 C. Rob. 70. J. J. Shiras, White and Peckham
dissented.
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RAILROADS-DUTY TO KEEP LooKouT AT CROSSINGS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE-CROWLEY V. LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RY. Co., 55 S. W. 434 (Ky.).-
Plaintiff, after waiting at a public crossing for a passenger train to go by,
started across and was struck by an engine, of the approach of which she bad
no warning. The evidence showed that if those in charge of the engine had
kept a proper lookout, her presence on the track might have been discovered
and her injury averted. Held, she could recover, though guilty of contrib-
utory negligence herself in thus going on the track.
Notwithstanding the negligence on the part of the person injured he may
recover, if the railway company, after such negligence occurred, could by the
exercise of ordinary care, have discovered it in time to have avoided inflicting
injury. Donohue v. St. Louis, etc., R- Co., 28 Am. & Eng. R. R. cases 673;
Kelly v. Hannibal, etc., Ry. Co., 75 fo1. 138. When the negligence of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury, and that of the plaintiff only
remote, the plaintiff may recover. Kerwhacker v. R. R. Co., 3 Ohio St. 172;
Aorrissey v. Wiggins Ferry Co , 47 Mo. 521.
STATUTE OF F-AUDs-Nxw AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACT-CONSIDERATION
MOVING TO PROMISOR-MANETTI v. DOEGE, 62 N. N. Sup. 918.-Plaintiff was em-
ployed by a sub-contractor to build a foundation. During the progress of the
work, plaintiff told defendant, the owner of the premises, that he was afraid
he would not be paid by the sub-contractor, and intended to abandon the job.
whereupon defendant said that he would pay him in case the sub-contractor
did not do so. Held, that the defendant, in consideration of the benefit to him
from uninterrupted work, made a new and independent contract with plaintiff,
enforceable by plaintiff on completion of the work.
There is no doubt that this case is correct according to the New York rule.
as stated in similar cases, but in many of the states this case would clearly
come under the Statute of Frauds. This is shown in Hooker v. Russell, 67
Wis. 257, where the court said: "1 So long as the original debt remains payable
by the debtor to his creditor, an agreement by any other party to pay is with-
in the statute, no matter what was the consideration for the latter promise."
SURETYSHIP-REAPPOINTMENT OF PhNcIPAL-LIABILITY-FIDELITY AND DE-
POSIT Co. OF MD. V. MOBILE COUNTY, 27 South. Rep. 386 (Ala.).-On June 22,
1897, plaintiff-in-error became surety to Mobile County for the faithful dis.
charge of the tax collector's duties. Prior to that time the collector had failed
to account for certain funds collected, but faithfully accounted for returns since
that day. Held, surety is liable.
The fact that a tax collector has collected funds which he fails to account
for on a day of adjustment raises a presumption that they will be paid on the
next settlement day, hence, even though plaintiff-in-error became surety after
the funds were actually misappropriated, it is still held liable for the embezzle-
ment. Bruce v. U. S., 21 U. S. 596.
TAXATION'OF PERSONALTY-VALUATION--STATE V. HALLIDAY, 56 N E. Ix8
Ohio.-The Bell Telephone Co. leased hand telephones to an Ohio concern at
$4 rental per year. The Bell Co. manufactured these instruments under a
patent, and were taxed on them at the rate of $3.42 per instrument, 20 per
cent. more than bare cost. The State Auditor directed the County Auditor to
assess these instruments at their true value in money, on the basis of the
income they produced to the owner, taking into account the value given by the
patent right. On application for mandamus the court said, when a manufac-
turer leases an article made by him under a patent, for a valuable considera-
tion, he should be taxed on its value, though that value be enhanced by a pat-
ent. Its true value is what it is worth to him, and the assessor must decide
what that is by every fact that he knows bearing on the question.
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The true value of an article is its value for the use to which it is put. This
doctrine is applied to railroads. State v. Ill., etc., Ry., 27111.64; Waterworks.
Stein v. Mobile, 17 Ala. 234. It was denied in regard to a toll bridge. State v.
Metz, 3 N. J. L. 378.
USURY-EFFECT ON CONTRAcT-PROVISION FoR ATTORizy's FEEs-UNIoN
MTG., BANKING AND TRusT Co. v. HAGOOD rT AL., 98 Fed. 779.-A statute
made loss of interest the penalty for usury, but provided that the contract
proper should be valid. A contract contained provision for fees in case of suit.
Held, that such provision is enforceable, even though the contract be held
usurious.
The distinguishing feature of this case is that the promise of an additional
payment was not an absolute, but a conditional one. The institution of the
suit was at the option of the defendant debtor, and the provision for the pay-
ment of fees in such event must be looked on as a collateral contract. This
brings the case within the Supreme Court rule as stated in Shain v. Hamilton,
1Wall. 626. The defendant relied on the divided opinion ot a State tribunal.
Agency Co. v. Gillam, 49 S. C. 350.
